Public finances and private balance sheets: an equilibrium under strain – 12 October 2026
On the one hand, states with record levels of debt, scrutinised by rating agencies and funding themselves at ever higher interest rates. On the other, large companies with high margins and strong balance sheets, about to report their third-quarter results and in some cases able to borrow on better terms than sovereigns. How can such a dichotomy be explained, and is it sustainable?
Barring a major surprise, the results to be announced by companies over the coming weeks will confirm the excellent earnings health of listed corporates. At the same time, the rating agencies will deliver their verdict on a few sovereign credits, including France¹. The contrast will be striking, as it has been for more than fifteen years in developed economies (Chart 1).
_
¹ Moody’s on 23 October and S&P on 27 November
Hardly had public finances emerged from the extraordinary shock of Covid when government budgets became overloaded by the many challenges of the decade — rearmament, energy shocks, populism, geoeconomic competition, demography, and so on. It is hardly surprising that they are most often running large deficits. Nor is it surprising that this spending contributes to economic growth and therefore to companies’ revenues and profits.
Formulated nearly a century ago, the Kalecki–Levy equation describes this interdependence precisely by linking corporate profits to the financial flows of other economic agents:
Corporate profits = Investment + Budget deficit – Household savings + Trade balance
In general, macroeconomic equilibrium, the balances of the private sector (households and companies), the public sector and the rest of the world offset one another. Today, corporate profits are being boosted by investment (including AI): hence the saying that “companies earn what they spend”. Added to this are public deficits, which act as a net subsidy to the private sector, less household savings. As for the impact of external accounts, while they vary from one country to another, they net to zero at global level, with some countries’ surpluses offsetting others’ deficits.
All else being equal, however large they may be, public deficits therefore mechanically swell corporate profits. Yet the dynamic of corporate prosperity alongside state deficits has a limit: sovereign solvency. When that solvency is called into question, households and companies begin to fear either a return of inflation (which central banks will fight with high interest rates), or a bout of fiscal austerity synonymous with economic slowdown, or, in the worst-case scenario, a rise in sovereign default risk signalling a major systemic shock.
Sovereign solvency directly affects corporate solvency. This is the principle of the “sovereign ceiling” applied by the rating agencies. They take the view that if a state loses access to financial markets, it may be tempted to capture, or even confiscate, the cash flows of local companies. In addition, a sovereign default would immediately destabilise the financial system, which holds a large share of public debt — an asset that is essential to overall liquidity. For these reasons, a company is, in principle, almost always rated below its sovereign.
That iron rule has, however, become more flexible in recent decades. Some multinationals now obtain ratings higher than that of their home country. Now global in scope, credits such as L’Oréal, LVMH and Sanofi have largely freed themselves from the financial condition of the French state. Moreover, the framework of the European Union, and even more so of the euro area, drastically limits the power of national governments to confiscate assets unilaterally. Finally, since the Greek crisis, the deployment of the ECB’s anti-fragmentation tools and the strengthening of banking regulation have sought to decouple the soundness of banks and insurers from the health of their sovereign issuer.
Bond markets, meanwhile, sometimes go even further than the rating agencies. In France, the yield differential (the spread) between large corporates and the sovereign has almost disappeared (Chart 2), despite less liquid market conditions for private issuers. Flagship names such as L’Oréal, LVMH, Sanofi and Air Liquide are now borrowing on terms markedly more favourable than those available to the French Treasury. Even in the banking sector, traditionally correlated with sovereign risk, the risk premia of players such as BNP Paribas have narrowed sharply relative to the sovereign. Recently, depending on the trading session, between 25% and 40% of euro-area corporate bonds were trading at yields below those of French OATs of the same maturity.
_
² Associated with the economist Michał Kalecki (1899–1970) and the American businessman Jerome Levy (1882–1967).
³ In equity markets, additional factors are also at work: listed companies benefit more than others from globalization, the AI boom, and a scale that gives them pricing power and strong lobbying capacity.
If distrust towards French debt were to intensify, this decoupling could become more pronounced, along the lines of the scenario observed in Italy in 2018. Even so, the protection enjoyed by major French companies against the state’s fragilities has its limits. The warning signal is already visible in the widening of Corporate France funding costs relative to German yields (Chart 3). Moreover, a French credit event or default would trigger a systemic European crisis — financial, economic and political — threatening the very existence of the euro area.
As the French case suggests, the durability of corporate prosperity will increasingly depend on governments’ ability to make the trajectory of their public finances credible. The responses to this challenge — which will vary from country to country — will have major implications for asset allocation, especially in the trade-off between sovereign debt, corporate bonds, equities and cash instruments.
At this stage, the level of macroeconomic uncertainty remains too high to favour any central scenario with strong conviction. In the immediate term, however, and as far as Europe is concerned, we nevertheless believe that German sovereign debt is regaining — at least temporarily — its status as a safe-haven asset and preferred hedge against market risks.


