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French debt crisis: the issues at stake in Phase II - 5 October 2026

After an initial phase characterised by a relatively orderly rise in risk premia on French debt, French financial stress is now taking a markedly more chaotic turn. Current dynamics are reminiscent of the acute crisis experienced by Italy in 2018. This process of “Italianisation” of France’s sovereign credit profile is beginning to affect all financial asset classes in Europe.

While the yield spreads between France and Germany had been widening steadily since March, markets have recorded a sharp acceleration in recent days (Chart 1). The rise in France’s risk premium is no longer confined to long and ultra-long maturities: it is now accelerating more rapidly at the short end of the yield curve.

Such a flattening of the French Treasury yield curve indicates that some investors are seeking more actively to protect themselves against credit risk¹ (default or debt restructuring). At the same time, the cost of five-year credit default swaps (CDSs²) on France has risen sharply.

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¹ In the event of a default, all an issuer’s bonds generally suffer the same percentage discount on their face value, which mechanically causes the theoretical yields of shorter-dated bonds to rise more sharply.
² CDS = “Credit Default Swaps”. Contracts that provide protection against an issuer’s failure to pay.

This market configuration is like that observed during the Italian crisis in 2018. At the time, the formation of an unprecedented government coalition between the Northern League and the Five Star Movement, which sought to distance itself from European fiscal discipline, triggered a similar surge in spreads in May, together with a pronounced flattening of the Italian yield curve (Chart 2).

In 2018, Italy had a credit rating of “BBB”, placing it just above speculative grade (below the BBB- threshold). A move into speculative grade would have triggered a major systemic crisis, since the European Central Bank’s (ECB) rules excluded such securities from its regular refinancing operations and from its asset-purchase programme then in force.

France currently benefits from a much higher starting rating, even though its downward trajectory is real and, of course, justified. The next rating reviews by the agencies are scheduled for 16 October (Fitch), 23 October (Moody’s) and 27 November (S&P Global). It is almost certain that Moody’s will downgrade France’s rating from Aa3 to A1, bringing it into line with the ratings assigned by the other agencies.

Fitch, for its part, confirmed its A+ rating with a stable outlook at the end of August 2026, even though the agency was forecasting public deficits of between 5% and 6% of GDP through to 2028, public debt of 122.7% of GDP in 2028, and continued strong political fragmentation after the next elections. Using the same pessimistic data as investors, the rating agencies therefore do not reach quite the same conclusions as the bond markets. However, these agencies will adjust their assessment to reflect the economic and fiscal stress created by the rise in interest rates itself and will take into account the government’s ability — or inability — to pass a 2027 budget that reduces the deficit at least to some extent.

Nevertheless, according to our dynamic valuation model³, which incorporates the impact of France’s negative rating trajectory, a further downgrade of its sovereign rating to “A” by all three major agencies would theoretically justify a 10-year France–Germany spread of 122 basis points. Yet, as of 2 October 2026, this spread stood at close to 150 basis points in the markets.

This additional premium probably reflects selling flows linked to a profound loss of confidence in French bonds, which until now had been regarded as a global euro-denominated “risk-free” reserve asset. The change in status of OATs is triggering substantial selling flows — and/or purchases of protection — by non-resident investors, who hold more than half of France’s public debt. This selling pressure looks difficult to reverse before the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2027. It is being fuelled by the political vacuum.

Under certain conditions, however, it could remain contained: the passage of a 2027 budget showing a reduction in the deficit, more moderate economic programmes from the parties likely to govern in 2027, changes in opinion polls, and so on. If not, there would then be — as economist Olivier Blanchard recently pointed out — a risk of a self-fulfilling process in which investors’ pessimism itself accelerates the probability of a default on the debt. In this extreme scenario, the only option would be to activate the safeguards provided for by the euro-area institutions⁴.

Because of its highly psychological nature, this risk is difficult to quantify. It nevertheless explains the initial contagion of the French bond crisis to other European assets (Chart 4). Spreads in the most highly indebted countries — Italy, Greece and Belgium — have risen significantly in recent days, particularly as the energy crisis is increasing pressure on their public finances.

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³ See our weekly note of 21 September 2026.
⁴ Activation of the European Stability Mechanism and/or the ECB’s TPI (Transmission Protection Instrument), both of which would involve substantial fiscal adjustments by the country concerned.

If it continued, this contagion would become problematic for the euro area, forcing the ECB to react, at least verbally. Christine Lagarde has already recently noted that the rise in long-term yields made monetary tightening less urgent. In the markets, investors are in any event beginning to hedge against a more difficult scenario for the euro area by buying German government bonds and selling the euro (Chart 5).

The recent dynamics of European financial markets therefore indicate that the French bond crisis has entered a new, more chaotic phase. We have adjusted our flexible and multi-asset portfolios accordingly in recent days: buying five- and ten-year German Bunds, taking profits on bond strategies involving the purchase of Japanese and UK government bonds against OATs, and on German curve-flattening strategies, and reducing our exposure to European financials. We are closely monitoring developments in the debate over the 2027 budget in France, as well as the impact of the French crisis on the rest of the euro area and on the ECB.

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